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Appellants My Fun Life Corp., a Delaware Corporation, Dan E. Edwards, and Carrie L. 
Edwards (husband and wife), by and tlu·ough their attorneys of record Mary E. Shea, Men-ill and 
Merrill Chartered, and Michael Hague, Hague Law Offices PLLC, state their Reply Brief as 
follows: 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Lunneborg asks this Comito uphold the District Court's findings on all issues as factually 
based and supported by the record. Upholding the District Court's decisions in this case would 
require this Comi to ignore well-settled law in this jurisdiction concerning the burden of proof on 
employment decisions. It would allow trial comis throughout Idaho to substitute their own 
judgment for that of an employer in a dispute concerning grounds for termination, in violation of 
Idaho precedent and contrary to decisions in similar cases all over the country. It would ignore 
the well-settled law in this jurisdiction and in other jurisdictions concerning the burden of proof 
required in piercing the corporate veil. It would allow the separate and personal prope1iy of a 
spouse of the owner of the corporation to be reached on a piercing the veil theory without requiring 
any proof that the spouse controlled the corporation or had any decision-making authority 
concerning the financial transactions in question. The District Court made multiple errors in its 
legal analysis which resulted in faulty factual and legal findings. Applying the con-ect legal 
standards, Lunneborg did not meet his burden of proof on just cause for termination; on piercing 
the corporate veil generally; or on finding that the personal and separate property of Carrie 
Edwards could be reached even though she is not an owner of MFL. 
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Employers in Idaho must feel confident that if they conduct a reasonable investigation 
concerning the conduct of their employees and find cause to terminate, an Idaho court will not 
simply second guess that decision and substitute its own judgment as some "super personnel 
committee." Corporate owners in Idaho must feel confident that corporate protections will not be 
set aside and personal assets will not be reached without requiring strict proof of the elements 
necessary to pierce the corporate veil. MFL and the Edwards ask this Com1 to take a very close 
look at the record in this case, and to apply the law correctly, and to reverse the unsuppo1ted 
findings of the District Comt. 
Lunneborg argues that the District Comt made several factual findings that deserve this 
Cami's deference on appeal and which support the final decision regarding termination for cause. 
Respondent's Brief pp. 1-2. This Court has stated that a trial court' s reliance on only one side's 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law is disfavored, particularly where those findings 
are not supported by the record. Rosecrans v. lntermountain Soap & Chem. Co., 100 Idaho 785, 
789, 605 P.2d 963, 967 (1980). In this case, findings of fact and conclusions of law were not 
submitted, but instead the parties filed briefs in lieu of closing argument. The District Comt 
adopted virtually all the factual asse11ions and legal arguments presented by Lunneborg, and 
rejected virtually all the factual conclusions and legal arguments presented by MFL and the 
Edwards. The District Court even after finding that the attorneys' fees request by Lunneborg 
"shocked the conscience," awarded Lunneborg most of what was requested. This Court should 
examine the record closely, because the District Court did not apply the law fairly and correctly to 
the undisputed and admitted relevant and material facts in this case. 
Appel lants' Reply Brief 
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GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION FOR CAUSE CAN BE DECIDED 
BY THE COURTS AS A MATTER OF LAW 
Lunneborg argues that the District Court's findings on termination for cause and pretext 
must be upheld because these determinations are factual in nature, and the District Court's findings 
were based on substantial and competent evidence. Lunneborg cites the case of Rosencrans, supra, 
for this proposition. In the Rosencrans decision, this Court did not discuss the trial court record in 
detail, but this Court noted that in that case, the witnesses "disagreed about almost everything," 
and credibility of the witnesses was, therefore, determinative. 100 Idaho at 789,605 P.2d 963. 
MFL and the Edwards recognize that this Court must give deference to the District Comi's 
credibility determinations. In this case, however, most of the relevant and material facts are 
undisputed, and credibility is not the primary issue. The evidence on which MFL relies to support 
the decision to terminate was presented by and admitted by Lunneborg in his own testimony, and 
through the testimony of his witnesses Richard Brooke and Dr. Schlapfer, and he cannot rise above 
his own evidence as will be discussed more fully below. There were not many disputes of material 
fact on the record in this case. Based on the undisputed and uncontroverted facts, including those 
judicially admitted by Lunneborg through his own testimony, there were reasonable grounds to 
terminate based on a good faith and appropriate investigation conducted by Dan Edwards about 
the noncompete contract being negotiated behind his back. 
The Idaho comis will not lightly second guess such decisions. A plaintiff employee's 
burden of proof on pretext is not met by merely alleging some alternative grounds for termination. 
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The plaintiffs butden is to provide substantial probative evidence to prove the profened grounds 
were 1) not believed subjectively by the employer, or 2) not consistent or believable. The Idaho 
courts give deference to nondiscriminatory employment decisions "even if the reason is foolish or 
trivial or even baseless." Frogley v. Meridian School District, 155 Idaho 558, 556, 314 P.3d 613, 
621 (2013). 
This Court's aiticulation of this rule of law is consistent with the cases previously cited in 
Appellants' Brief, pp. 29-30. As the Washington Supreme Comt, sitting en bane, stated in the 
Baldwin decision (which was relied upon by the District Comt below), there are two threshold 
issues presented when an employer terminates for just cause: 1) what is the meaning of "just 
cause," and 2) who gets to make the decision. The Washington Court, consistent with the Oregon 
Supreme Court and the California Supreme Court, and consistent with this Court's decision in 
Frogley v. Meridian School District, decided that it is fundamentally and primarily the employer's 
decision to dete1mine just cause, and it is the role of the comts to determine simply whether the 
employer acted reasonably under the circumstances. Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence in 
Washington, Inc. , 112 Wash.2d 127, 769 P.2d 298 (1989), citing Simpson v. Western Graphics 
Corp., 293 Or. 96, 643 P.2d 1276 (1982) (en bane); see also Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall, 
International Inc. , 17 Cal.4th (1998). 
If the employer acted reasonably and in good faith belief that the facts it relied upon were 
true, a plaintiff employee caimot meet their burden of proof and persuasion on pretext. Comts all 
over the country have dismissed employment termination for cause cases as a matter of law, 
usually on summary judgment. For example, in Jameson v. Pacific Gas and Electric Company, 
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16 Cal.App. 5th 901, 225 Ca1Rptr3d 171 (2017), the California court upheld summary judgment 
for defendant employer, which terminated an employee for retaliating against a co-worker who 
repo1ted safety violations. In that case, the employer did an investigation and reached suppo1ted 
conclusions, but the plaintiff employee challenged the sufficiency of the investigation and 
conclusions. The California Supreme Court held the issue was not whether the employer could 
have conducted a better investigation or should have reached different conclusions - the issue was 
whether the employer reached conclusions honestly after a reasonable investigation, and did not 
act arbitrarily. 16 Cal.App. at 910-911, 225 CalRptr 3d 178-179. See also Tibbs v. Administrative 
Office of the Illinois Courts, 860 F.3d 502 (7th Cir. 2017) (summary judgment granted in favor of 
defendant employer); Stacey Bird v. Cascade County, 386 Mont. 69, 386 P.3d 602 (7th Cir. 2016); 
Juback v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 143 F.Supp. 3d 1195 (M.D. Florida 2015) (dismissing cause to 
terminate/pretext case on summary judgment, stating courts do not sit as a "super personnel 
depaitment" that re-examines an entity' s business decisions). 
Lunneborg succeeded in convincing the District Comt this case was a "good guy versus 
bad guys" dispute, and Lunneborg succeeded in convincing the District Court that the Edwards 
were the bad guys in every respect. The Edwards do not agree the record supports this 
characterization, but that is not the legal issue before this Court. If this Court agrees that the 
undisputed and admitted material facts on this record demonstrate that MFL, acting through Dan 
Edwards, conducted a reasonable investigation of the facts under the circumstances, and those 
facts reasonably suppo1ted his decision to terminate Lunneborg, this Cowt must reverse the 
District Court and enter final judgment in favor of MFL consistent with the law. 
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LUNNEBORG CANNOT RISE ABOVE HIS OWN EVIDENCE CONCERNING 
TERMINATION FOR CAUSE 
It is well-settled law in Idaho and throughout the country that a litigant cannot rise above 
their own evidence. The rule in Idaho is that pai1y testimony offered into evidence is prima facie 
proof of the facts asse11ed, and it will be binding if it is not contradicted. Strouse v. K-Tek, Inc., 
129 Idaho 616, 619, 930 P.2d 1361, 1364 (1997). As this Com1 has explained, "[s]tatements 
contained in the evidence of a party constitute informal judicial admissions on his pai1 which are 
accorded the quality of prima facie proof and for purposes of the action must be taken as true." 
Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 68 Idaho 470,475, 199 P.2d 264,266 (1948). 
This case did not present a real credibility contest that needed to be resolved by the trier of 
fact. Lunneborg testified unequivocally that the central purpose of his employment at MFL was 
to be COO, and to lead development of products for the members of the multi-level marketing 
company to distribute. (Tr. p. 271, L. 7-10). Lunneborg testified it was always his intent, Dr. 
Todd Schlapfer's intent, and Dan Edwards' intent that Lunneborg and Dr. Schlapfer would work 
together to develop products for MFL, and that was a primary reason why Lunneborg was hired 
by MFL. (Tr. p. 316). Lunneborg testified that Dan Edwards had no experience in product 
development, and that is why he need to recruit someone who did. (Tr. p. 167). Lunneborg 
testified that he requested, and his previous employer agreed to pay him $5,000/month for a 
consulting arrangement with OxyFresh, because he was an asset to OxyFresh and it would hurt his 
former employer if he depai1ed without helping the company to transition to a future without him. 
(Tr. p. 173-174). Lunneborg also testified he wanted this pay from OxyFresh to be a "bridge" until 
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his performance based salary increases kicked in at MFL, because he was taking a pay cut to work 
for MFL. (Tr. p. 175). 
Dan Edwards testified he knew about and supported Lunneborg's ongoing paid consulting 
relationship with OxyFresh, provided it did not prevent Lunneborg from developing products for 
MFL. (Tr. p. 502-503). This testimony was not rebutted. Both Dan and Lunneborg testified that 
Lunneborg could not enter into a noncompete or similar agreement with OxyFresh that would 
prevent Lunneborg from developing products at MFL, because such an agreement would defeat a 
primary purpose of his employment at MFL. (Tr. pp. 337-340; p. 428-429; p. 507). 
The evidence is undisputed because Lunneborg himself testified that on May 15, 2014, he 
wrote to a message to Dan and Carrie Edwards stating: 
Good news. I had over an hour face-to-face with RB [Richard Brooke] last night. 
We are good now. He signed my consulting agreement. We have a mutual 
understanding and ended upon on good terms. They will name me to the advisory 
board and announce that I have taken an opportunity to grow my career. I'll stay 
as an advisor and R&D guru on the advisory board. Six-month consulting 
agreement. This gives them ample transition time. 
(Tr. p. 210, L. 10-17). The evidence is additionally undisputed, because Lunneborg himself 
testified that Brooke had not, in fact, signed any written consulting agreement with Lunneborg. 
Instead, Lunneborg said they "shook hands" on the deal, which Lunneborg in his mind felt was as 
good as a written agreement. (Tr. 335). There is no testimony that Lunneborg clarified this 
distinction with the Edwards, although Lunneborg assumed they must have known there was no 
written agreement when Brooke was requesting a written agreement containing a noncompete 
clause be signed. (Tr. 336-337). Dan and Carrie Edwards reasonably assumed from this 
representation by Lunneborg that they did not have to worry about Brooke 's desire for a non-
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compete agreement, because he had already signed a consulting agreement that did not require 
one. Dan Edwards testified that he was confused because he learned there was never a written 
consulting agreement between Lunneborg and OxyFresh for the first time at trial. Dan further 
testified that regardless of whether the contract was oral or written, Brooke had made it clear to 
Dan Edwards that in his view, Lunneborg's consulting agreement with OxyFresh was contingent 
on Lunneborg not developing products for MFL as a multi-level marketing entity, and Brooke 
would not permit Lunneborg to do so. (Tr. pp. 580-583). 
The evidence is undisputed that between May 22, 2014 and July 15, 2014, Richard Brooke 
expressed clearly, consistently, and multiple times to Lunneborg, Dr. Schlapfer, and ultimately on 
July 15 to Dan Edwards, that Lunneborg could not continue to be employed in any capacity at 
OxyFresh while developing competing products for MFL as a multi-level marketing company, and 
any consulting agreement between OxyFresh and Lunneborg was conditioned on that 
understanding. (Tr. pp. 211-212; pp. 338-342; p. 379; p. 513-520; Defendants' Exh. A. p. 38-39; 
p. 200; p. 502; Plaintiffs Exhs. 25-28). It is additionally undisputed that Brooke was fine with 
Lunneborg developing products for MFL in a retail capacity. (Defendants' Exh. A, pp. 202-203; 
Plaintiffs Exh. 28, p. 10). 
Lunneborg's witnesses Richard Brooke and Dr. Schlapfer testified consistently. Brooke 
testified that Lunneborg told him repeatedly that he was not hired to develop products at MFL, a 
statement which by Lunneborg's trial testimony was not true. (Plaintiffs Exh. 47, Tr. p. 41, L. 6-
21; p. 344, L. 5-7). Dr. Schlapfer testified unequivocally that he knew from the beginning that 
Brooke would "never" allow Lunneborg to develop product at MFL while he was in a paid 
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consulting and advising relationship with OxyFresh. (Plaintiffs Exh. 48, Tr. p. 33-34). The only 
real material disputes of fact in this case, aside from Lunneborg and Schlapfer' s assertions about 
Dan Edward's request that they "knock off' an OxyFresh product, are between Lunneborg and 
Brooke. Lunneborg testified that Brooke had agreed to continue the paid consulting airnngement 
even though Lunneborg refused to sign the contract containing noncompete clause. Brooke 
testified he would not continue to employ Lunneborg on the consulting arrangement without the 
noncompete clause, he believed Lunneborg had agreed to it in principal, and that was the basis for 
his continued payments to Lunneborg and request that Dan and Carrie Edwards sign the 
noncompete agreement. The Idaho comis are not permitted to second guess Dan Edward's 
reasonable decision under the circumstances to believe Brooke that Lunneborg would not be able 
to develop products at MFL unless he quit his position with OxyFresh. When Lunneborg declined 
to do that, Dan Edwai·ds had no choice but to terminate Lunneborg for being unable to fulfill one 
of the central purposes of his job at MFL. 
As the Baldwin court noted, the threshold question this Comi must answer is what 
constitutes "good cause" to terminate when an employment contract does not define it. Employee 
disloyalty, including full disclosure of all facts relevant to the employment relationship, is a 
reasonable expectation of Idaho employers. Jensen v. Sidney Stevens Implement Co., 36 Idaho 
348,353,2 10 P. 1003, 1005 (1922). It logically follows that breach of that duty of loyalty and full 
disclosure would constitute just cause to terminate under Idaho law. The Idaho comis may also 
look to the employment expectations understood by both parties to determine whether just cause 
to te1minate exists. In this case, the evidence is undisputed that leading product development was 
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a primary purpose of Lunneborg' s work for MFL. If Dan Edwards had a reasonable belief based 
on a reasonable investigation of facts that Lunneborg could not or would not fulfill that job duty, 
that would logically constitute just cause to terminate. 
Lunneborg persuaded the District Court to chase some "red heITings" in this case, by 
making findings of fact and law that are completely iITelevant to the reason why Lunneborg was 
fired. This Com1 should not make the same mistake. For example, the District Court agreed with 
Lunneborg that there was some legal significance to the fact that Lunneborg was hired to be COO 
of MFL, and not just develop products for MFL. The undisputed fact that Lunneboi'g was also 
hired by MFL to be its COO, and that MFL took no issue with Lunneborg's job performance as 
COO, is irrelevant. As one court explained, "it is nonsensical to suppose that a plaintiff should be 
able to demonstrate that an employer's stated reason for its adverse action is pretext for 
discrimination merely because the employer cannot prove that the plaintiff was deficient in every 
aspect of his job performance." Brown v. Vance-Cooks, 920 F. Supp. 2d 61, 72 (2013) (granting 
summary judgment for defendant employer). MFL did not fire Lunneborg because he was not a 
good COO. MFL fired Lunneborg because in the two months of his employment, he had made no 
progress in leading product development, and because Dan Edwards learned after speaking with 
Richard Brooke and Dr. Schlapfer that Lunneborg would never be able to lead product 
development for MFL so long as he was still employed by OxyFresh. Defendant' s Exh. A, p. 500. 
As another example, the District Court attached legal significance to the fact that there was 
no final written consulting contract between OxyFresh and Lunneborg, and that Dan Edwards 
relied on "false rumor" that there was one. First, there was no false rumor. Dan Edwards had 
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seen for himself that there was contract being circulated between OxyFresh and Lunneborg, 
because Lunneborg showed him the contract. Dan Edwards confirmed through his conversation 
with Richard Brooke, CEO of OxyFresh, on July 15, 2014, that Brooke believed there was an 
agreement being actively negotiated, and that Lunneborg's continued relationship with OxyFresh 
depended on it. Although Lunneborg denied this, Edwards was not required to take Lunneborg's 
word for it, especially after Brooke's position had been confirmed by Lunneborg' s good friend 
and collaborator, Dr. Schlapfer. 
Second and perhaps more importantly, Dan Edwards did not fire Lunneborg because he 
thought there was an existing written noncompete contract. He fired Lunneborg, on the face of 
the termination letter, because he believed Richard Brooke that Lunneborg had been negotiating 
such a contract with OxyFresh. Edwards testified that Brooke could potentially sue if Lunneborg 
violated that understanding, and Edwards believed, reasonably after investigating and talking to 
the interested parties, that was the reason why Lunneborg was not making progress in developing 
products for MFL. Lunneborg, and the District Court, completely ignored the legal exposure 
Lunneborg's conduct created for MFL and the Edwards. If Lunneborg tried to develop products 
for MFL, Brooke could have taken legal action based on OxyFresh' s perfo1mance of what he 
thought was an agreement between OxyFresh and Lunneborg. 
Lunneborg persuaded the District Court there was some legal significance to the fact that 
Lunneborg could not have brought a product to market in the two months he was employed by 
MFL, because Dan had to "green light" any product development, and because Dr. Schlapfer had 
not been hired on contract with MFL. This is another red herring. The testimony of both 
Appellants' Reply Brief 
11468/mes 
Page 111 
Lunneborg and Edwards was that there was no expectation that Lunneborg had to bring products 
to market within the first few months of his employment. (Tr. 169). Dan understood that was not 
possible. On the face of the termination letter written by Dan Edwards, Lunneborg was terminated 
because he was not making "any significant progress" to the end of bringing products to market, 
and because he seemed to be stalling with product development. Defendant' s Exh. A, p. 500. 
Lunneborg's own testimony establishes it was always the intent of Lunneborg, Dr. Schlapfer, and 
Dan Edwards that Dr. Schlapfer would be brought on contract with MFL to help Lunneborg with 
product development. At the time he was terminated, Lunneborg was preparing the agreement 
with Dr. Schlapfer. The evidence is further undisputed because Lunneborg himself testified that 
Lunneborg was expected to lead product development, because he and Dr. Schlapfer had the 
expertise and experience, and Dan Edwards did not. (Tr. 418). Although Dan had final say on 
what products would be developed, the evidence is undisputed Lunneborg was expected to bring 
Dan Edwards feasible ideas for product development, and that he and Dr. Schlapfer were the 
"expe1is" in that department. (Tr. pp. 167, 169). When Lunneborg did not do that, and when Dan 
realized the reason why was the consulting aiTangement with OxyFresh based on his discussions 
with Brooke and Dr. Schlapfer, Dan had no choice but to terminate Lunneborg for cause. 
This Cowi should reject Lunneborg's attempts to argue he proved "pretext" through his 
allegations, made for the very first time the day after Lunneborg and Dr. Schlapfer realized Dan 
Edwards was considering firing Lunneborg, that Dan Edwai·ds asked them to illegally "reverse-
engineer" an OxyFresh product, and this was the "real reason" for the termination. By law, this 
allegation is insufficient to prove pretext, unless Lunneborg can also persuade this Court that Dan 
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Edwards did not subjectively and reasonably believe that Lunneborg had been negotiating a non-
compete agreement with OxyFresh, and that Lunneborg could not or would not develop products 
for MFL so long as he continued working for OxyFresh. The District Comt committed legal error 
by not giving deference to Dan Edwards' factual dete1minations that Lunneborg did not make 
"significant progress" leading product development for MFL, and the reasons for it. This Court 
should reject Lunneborg's invitation to do the same. 
It should be remembered that the Idaho Wage Claims Act trebles damages, and therefore 
the burden of proof must be followed strictly. Idaho courts cannot be cavalier in reciting facts that 
are not material to the reason for termination in justifying such an award. Idaho courts must follow 
the law and give appropriate deference to the reasonable factual findings of the employer justifying 
the adverse employment action. On this record, Dan Edwards had adequate grom1ds to terminate, 
and the District Court focused on irrelevant facts, and did not give Dan Edwards appropriate 
deference as the primary fact finder on whether grounds to terminate existed. 
LUNNEBORG IS BOUND BY THE UNCONTRADICTED EVIDENCE OF HIS 
WITNESS CARRIE EDWARDS, AND HE CANNOT SHIFT THE BURDEN OF PROOF 
TO DEFENDANTS ON PIERCING THE CORPORA TE VEIL 
The general and well settled rule of evidence followed throughout the country, 
acknowledged in part by this Court in the Crenshaw decision, supra, states that when a party uses 
an adverse witness to prove elements of their claims, they are bound by that testimony if it is clear, 
reasonable, and uncontradicted. See, e.g ., Horne v. Milrim, 226 Va. 133, 306 S.E.2d 893 (1983); 
ProctorElec. Co. v. Zink,2 l7Md. 22, 141 A.2d 721 (1958);Amatov. Landy,4 l6Pa. l1 5, 204 
A.2d 914 (1964); Bucyna v. Risso Bros. Movers, Inc., 31 Ill.App.2d 31, 175 N.E.2d 640 (1961); 
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Humes v. Young, 219 Miss. 417, 69 S.0.2d 245 (1954). Lunneborg did not request specifically 
to treat Carrie Edwards as an adverse witness, but no objections were made on the record to any 
leading questions asked of Carrie Edwards. 
Even if Carrie Edwards was not an adverse witness, then the general rule articulated above 
and as stated in the Crenshaw case applies: Lunneborg cannot rise above his own evidence. He 
called Carrie Edwards to prove his case in chief on piercing the corporate veil. Her testimony was 
not impeached, and it was not contradicted. Lunneborg persuaded the District Court to find that 
because Carrie's testimony concerning the accounting practices of the companies and the Edwards 
was not "backed up" by actual bank statements and loan documents, it was not credible. 
Lunneborg cannot call Carrie Edwards as a witness to prove the elements of his case related to 
piercing the corporate veil, and then ask the Court to find her testimony incredible because it was 
not bolstered by documentation. Lunneborg in his Respondent's Brief does not disagree that he 
bears the burden of proof and persuasion on piercing the corporate veil. Requiring Carrie Edwards 
to bolster her testimony through additional documentation effectively and improperly shifts the 
burden of proof to the Defendant to demonstrate that their financial transactions were legitimate 
to avoid liability. It was Lunneborg' s burden to prove the financial transactions of MFL and the 
Edwards were not legitimate or accounted for properly; it was not the Edwards ' burden to prove 
they were. 
Lunneborg produced no evidence that challenged or contradicted Carrie Edward's 
testimony that funds and debts were properly segregated between the various corporations and 
between Dan and Carrie Edwards personally; that all compensation received by Dan and Canie 
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Edwards and their children were pursuant to the membership agreements and the legitimate and 
legal business plan of MFL; that all funds received by the Edwards from MFL were reported 
properly for income tax purposes; that automobile expenses were segregated by proper accounting 
procedures and based on the advice of an accountant; that all loans between entities were paid back 
among the entities, to the penny; and that rent and building maintenance payments between the 
entities were shared equitably. Carrie's testimony was clear, and it was supported by spreadsheets 
she downloaded from the bookkeeping systems of the entities which were offered and admitted 
without objection as to foundation or for any other reason. Her testimony was uncontradicted by 
any other documents or testimony offered by Lunneborg. The District Court committed legal error 
by rejecting that testimony because it was not bolstered by additional documentation, instead of 
holding Lunneborg to his very high burden of proof on piercing the corporate veil. 
It must also be remembered that most of the financial transactions complained of by 
Lunneborg as some suggestion of impropriety by the Edwards occurred before Lunneborg was 
even hired. They could not, as a matter of law, evidence an intent to defraud him or create an 
unjust result. 
Finally, even though Idaho law holds, and the District Court recognized that MFL's 
bankruptcy is not enough to pierce the corporate veil, the District Court did find the bankruptcy to 
be evidence of the Edwards' "depletion" of the corporation, although there was no proof offered 
of such depletion between the years 20 14-2016. The evidence was uncontradicted and supported 
by Lunneborg 's own testimony that MFL was flush with cash and was growing in 2013 and 2014. 
By July 2014, Lunneborg testified that he realized MFL membership was waning. He testified 
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that he knew this was caused, in paii, by the failure to bring new products for members to 
distribute. (Tr. 397, 396-397). Lunneborg testified there were other legitimate reasons for the 
decrease in membership in 2014 (Tr. 396-397), and he testified that he did not believe raising 
membership prices without offering more products or services would be an appropriate way to 
address the downward business trajectory. (Tr. 202-203). Carrie Edwards testified as Lunneborg 's 
witness, and her testimony was uncontradicted, that by late 2014 and 2015, MFL was losing 
members and therefore losing money, to the point where the Edwards' other entity TraffiCorp was 
propping it up financially, and it was clear MFL would not survive. (Tr. pp. 53-55; 141-145). 
There was vi1iually no evidence produced to supp01i any inference that it was improper depletion 
of the corporate resources by the Edwards between 2014 and 2016 that caused the company to go 
bankrupt. The only evidence on this record is that MFL was losing members, at least in part 
indisputably because they did not bring new products to market for members to distribute in 2014 
or subsequent. 
Lunneborg does not dispute the Edward's legal position that a creditor cannot reach the 
personal assets of a corporate non-shareholder absent proof that the non-shareholder effectively 
controlled the financial decision making of the corporation. There was absolutely no evidence 
offered by Lunneborg on this issue. All that was asked of Carrie Edwards during her testimony 
was her job titles. She was not asked to explain her job duties. The fact that she helped recruit 
Lunneborg and attended meetings and discussed Lunneborg's employment is inelevant; the 
District Court found c01Tectly that Carrie Edwards was not sued directly for her role in the 
termination of Lunneborg. 
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The District Court found that Carrie Edwards "moved the money" between the entities, but 
there were absolutely no questions asked of Carrie to prove this. Can-ie testified extensively about 
her knowledge about the bookkeeping and accounting practices of all the entities, but she was 
never asked, and she never testified, about who made the bookkeeping and accounting decisions 
for MFL. Even if she physically moved the money, and the record is silent about that, there was 
no testimony adduced to prove this was based on her own decision making. No other witness, 
including Dan Edwards, was asked about Carrie's decision-making authority for MFL or her 
control of the finances of MFL. As a matter of law, Lunneborg did not meet his burden of proof 
to pierce the corporate veil for Carrie Edwards as a non-shareholder. This Court must, at a 
minimum, reverse this paii of the District Court's judgment. It is the unusual set of facts that 
would allow a court to pierce the corporate veil to reach the personal assets of a non-owner of a 
corporation. Idaho courts ought not permit veil piercing for non-owners when the proof of 
financial control for the purpose of self-dealing and defrauding creditors was not adduced on the 
record. 
THE ATTORNEYS' FEE A WARD BY THE DISTRICT COURT 
WAS EXCESSIVE AND UNFAIR 
MFL and the Edwards will not restate their arguments previously made. Lunneborg 
complains that MFL and the Edwards did not prove that the plaintiffs investment of legal 
resources was unreasonable for a three-day trial. The District Court found that the fees requested 
were excessive for a factually and legally uncomplicated three-day trial, the demand shocked the 
court's conscience, and they were unprecedented in the trial judge's fifteen years on the bench. 
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That is proof that the investment of legal resources was unreasonable under the circumstances. 
The District Comi committed error by arbitrarily slicing the fee by only ten percent on that basis, 
and by reducing hourly fees only slightly. Allowing five attorneys to bill time on a case like this 
was not reasonable w1der the circumstances. Defendants only had one attorney to present their 
case, which he did competently. 
Lunneborg complains that MFL caused him to invest more time in the case due to the 
discovery disputes. The record is undisputed, however, that attorneys' fees award related to that 
discovery dispute was $8,823 .75. That is the proper and fair measure of the legal cost of that 
discovery dispute to Lunneborg. Lunneborg employs hyperbole to suggest that it was the 
discovery delay that permitted the Edwards' to loot the company and deplete assets, without 
providing any proof whatsoever that improper depletion of MFL assets occurred between 2014 
and 2016. Fmther, by Lunneborg's own timeline, the discovery dispute was first raised as an issue 
in July 2015, and it was resolved by early October 2015. Respondent's Brief, p. 3-4. It is ludicrous 
to suggest that the discovery dispute or the bankruptcy of MFL complicated this litigation 
sufficient to justify an award of $167,028.69. This award amounted to a trial cost of $55,676.23 
per day. Five attorneys and I 048 hours were not required to competently try this case, and even 
with that investment of resources, Lunneborg failed to meet the elements of proof on his claims. 
It should be noted that part of Lunneborg' s justification for including the discovery dispute in the 
final attorneys' fee award was to avoid the fact that only MFL was the defendant during the 
discovery dispute resulting in the first attorneys' fee judgment, and MFL is now insolvent. This 
Comt should reverse the District Comt on the substantive legal issues and enter final judgment in 
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favor of MFL and the Edwards, and render this issue moot. If this Court affinns or remands any 
issue, this Comi must direct the District Court to re-examine this award and reduce it down to a 
something more reasonable. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court committed legal errors in its analysis of the breach of contract claim and 
piercing the corporate veil. The District Court's attorneys' fee analysis evidence a desire to punish 
the Defendants for alleged malfeasance, even though there was no malfeasance shown on this 
record. This Comi should reverse the decisions, and find that MFL and the Edwards are not liable 
to Lunneborg, and grant any other relief deemed appropriate. 
Dated this l 8thth day of January 2018. 
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